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ABSTRACT The combination of smart home platforms and automation apps introduces much convenience
to smart home users. However, this also brings the potential for privacy leakage. If a smart home platform
is permitted to collect all the events of a user day and night, then the platform will learn the behavior
patterns of this user before long. In this paper, we investigate how IFTTT, one of the most popular smart
home platforms, has the capability of monitoring the daily life of a user in a variety of ways that are hardly
noticeable. Moreover, we propose multiple ideas for mitigating privacy leakages, which altogether forms a
“Filter-and-Fuzz” (F&F) process: first, it filters out events unneeded by the IFTTT platform; then, it fuzzes
the values and frequencies of the remaining events. We evaluate the F&F process, and the results show that
the proposed solution makes IFTTT unable to recognize any of the user’s behavior patterns.
INDEX TERMS IFTTT, privacy leakage, smart home, SmartThings
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart Home, a typical application of Internet of Things
(IoTs), has become increasingly popular in recent years.
Smart home devices, such as various sensors and appliances,
have been changing the way people interact with their homes.
One can monitor remotely monitor state information (e.g.,
temperature, humidity, occupancy, etc.) or control smart ap-
pliances (e.g., turn on/off a lock, configure the routine of a
thermostat, etc.) in a smart home. The devices in early stages
were heterogeneous, so they could only work in a scattered
manner due to limited interoperability. Emerging IoT plat-
forms provide a revolution to the smart home. A platform
provides a new ecosystem, which typically comprises various
smart devices, a local hub, and a backend cloud. Some plat-
forms also provide a programming framework for third-party
developers to contribute novel intelligence to smart homes
by publishing IoT apps; such platforms are called appified
platforms. The users choose IoT apps to control their devices
contextually and automatically, known as home automation.
Samsung’s SmartThings [1], Google’s Weave/Brillo [2], and
Apple’s HomeKit [3] are several dominant examples of appi-
fied platforms.
To support more services, devices, and user interfaces,
IoT platforms also integrate third-party services by exposing
cloud APIs. This allows distinct services, clouds, and appli-
cations to manage a smart home collaboratively.
For instance, SmartThings provides endpoints in its IoT
apps (a.k.a., SmartApps) to allow third-party services/appli-
cations (e.g., IFTTT) to gain access to the devices in its
system. IFTTT (an initialism for “If This, Then That”) is
a free web service to create chains of simple conditional
statements which are also called applets. “This” and “That”
are the trigger and action of an applet, respectively. In other
words, an IFTTT app (applet) works in the way that “If
a trigger is observed, then perform an action”. IFTTT can
also concatenate different popular Internet services, such as
Gmail, Instagram, Facebook, and SmartThings. By integrat-
ing SmartThings and IFTTT, users are able to gain more
intelligence by installing IoT apps from both SmartThings
and IFTTT.
However, the risk of a privacy breach is also increased by
these Trigger-Action IoT platforms. This is because multiple
platforms gain access to the users’ devices. Despite support-
ing various services, the device data (e.g., sensor readings,
appliance status) are tightly related to user activities and daily
routines and the revelation of some sensitive data can cause
privacy threats to users.
In this paper, we analyzed the workflows of several typical
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3rd-party platforms and found that they share similarities in
their potential to monitor a user’s daily life excessively in
three ways: 1) they can obtain the states of the devices that
are not related to any apps; 2) they can get redundant state
records, though many records cannot trigger any apps; 3)
most third-party apps do not need the accurate values of a
numeric sensor measurement, but they continuously receive
these values.
We chose to analyze SmartThings (which connects IoT
devices and provides services) and some prevalent 3rd-party
platforms (which provide services) due to the large user base
they have. There are more apps in the SmartThings plat-
form than the competing platforms such as Weavo/Brillo and
HomeKit [4]. For IFTTT, there are 11 million users running
over 1 billion apps on its server [5]. IFTTT developed a Web
Service SmartApp running on SmartThings as an agent,
which exposes web endpoints and allows the IFTTT server
to access devices in the SmartThings system [6].
To prove the redundancy of the event records that are
uploaded to 3rd-party platforms, we proposed a mechanism
called “Filter&Fuzz” (F&F for short) to filter the record
events. The essential idea of F&F is that an event does not
always have to be uploaded to the 3rd-party apps, and even if
it is required, it can be filtered and fuzzed. This significantly
reduces the events uploaded to the remote 3rd parties and
thus, they can barely recognize a user’s behavior pattern.
We experimented with F&F for two agent SmartApps for
an identical 3rd-party platform. One is the original agent
that monitors and uploads all user events, while the other is
customized to only upload events filtered and fuzzed by F&F.
The comparative experiment proved that the whole system
can still work properly while most event records have been
filtered.
However, only filtering the event records is insufficient
as the statistical character of the event records can still be
calculated to infer users’ life patterns. Therefore, other than
filtering the records, we proposed a new protocol between the
smart home and 3rd-party platforms to hide the true statistical
character of a smart home’s event records.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We investigate how the integration of several 3rd-party
platforms may cause privacy threats to SmartThings
users by learning the agent SmartApps of these plat-
forms. We use IFTTT as a representative example to
illustrate how these 3rd-party platforms can monitor a
user in several ways which are hardly noticeable.
2) We propose a mechanism to prove the redundancy
of the event records that uploaded to the 3rd-party
platforms. We prove that, the integration of 3rd-party
platforms can still work properly if most event records
have been filtered.
3) To completely hide the statistical character of the fil-
tered event records, we propose a component for data
shared between a major smart home platform and a
3rd-party platform. This component runs on a smart
home platform and prevents a Trigger-Action 3rd-party
platform from obtaining the pattern of the filtered event
records.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. THE ARCHITECTURE OF SMARTTHINGS PLATFORM
To use the SmartThings service, a user must buy a Smart-
Things hub and several end devices. All the end devices are
connected via ZigBee, Z-Wave, or Wi-Fi to a hub which
maintains an SSL-protected link to the cloud backend. The
end devices can be divided into two categories: sensors and
actuators. The role of sensors in the SmartThings ecosystem
is to gather the state of the house, for example, the presence
of the user, the illuminance value of a room, the lock state
of a smart lock, the power consumption of an apartment,
and so forth. When a sensor detects state changes, the new
state will be uploaded to the cloud backend via the hub. These
new states are treated as “events”. Other than sensors, actu-
ators are devices that can “act”—they perform some specific
commands such as “turning on a switch” (switch.on())
or “locking the door” (lock.close()). Every device in
a house is represented by a SmartDevice running on the
cloud backend. As the virtual representation of a physical
device, SmartDevice translates raw data generated by an
end device to events or commands that are suitable for
SmartApps. The architecture of the SmartThings platform
is shown in Fig. 1. A user can browse the app market and
install SmartApps using the companion app. SmartApps run
on the cloud backend, but SmartThings enables the latest
hub to run SmartApps. The user can grant a SmartApp a
subscription to several end devices, enabling that SmartApp
to monitor events generated by sensors and operate actuators
by sending commands. For example, a user may install an air
conditioner control SmartApp which can be summarized to
“Turn on the air conditioner when the temperature is higher
than 30◦C” and grant this SmartApp a temperature sensor
and an air conditioner. The temperature sensor will upload
temperature readings to the cloud, and when this value turns
to be above 30◦C, this SmartApp will send the command to
the air conditioner to turn it on. This example also illustrates
how SmartThings automatically manipulate devices as the
users wish.
Of course, SmartThings have to allow manual operation
by the user at any time. Before controlling any devices, the
user will refresh for the latest state of his house. This means
that the cloud backend must provide timely and accurate state
information to the companion app.
B. WEBSERVICE SMARTAPPS AND THE 3RD-PARTY
APP
In order to grab market share and offer more flexibility to de-
velopers, SmartThings supports the WebService SmartApps.
These SmartApps expose a URL and some defined endpoints,
enabling themselves as a tiny web service. A developer can
implement a WebService SmartApp and develop a remote
3rd-party app, which runs on a mobile phone or a web
server. Granted by a user, the 3rd-party app can obtain an
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FIGURE 1: The architecture of SmartThings platform.
OAuth token released by SmartThings as the credentials to
communicate with the corresponding WebService SmartApp
via HTTP GET, PUT, POST and DELETE methods. In other
words, the 3rd-party app can access the state of, or operate the
end devices that are subscribed to the WebService SmartApps
with those credentials. The OAuth process between the 3rd-
party app and the cloud backend is beyond the scope of
this paper. In this scenario, the WebService SmartApp is
essentially an agent SmartApp between the 3rd-party app
and the end devices. This workflow differs from the regular
SmartApps because the developers move the functionality of
a regular SmartApp to the 3rd-party app, leaving the Web-
Service SmartApp solely responsible for the communications
between the 3rd-party apps and the end devices.
1) A 3rd-party app sends messages to the SmartApp
If a developer wants to enable a 3rd-party app to refresh
the state of some devices or send an operation command to
an actuator, the mappings declaration in the WebService
SmartApp code allows this SmartApp to expose the HTTP
endpoints and map the various supported HTTP operations
to the associated handlers.
1 mappings {
2 path("/switches") {
3 action: [
4 GET: "listSwitches"
5 ]
6 }
7
8 path("/switches/:command") {
9 action: [
10 PUT: "updateSwitches"
11 ]
12 }
13 }
Listing 1: Map the HTTP operations to corresponding
handlers.
The snippet in Listing 1 shows a typical WebService
SmartApp supporting two endpoints. The /switches end-
point will support the GET (line 4) requests. It will call the
listSwitches() method and then send back the return
value. The /switches/:command endpoint enables the
SmartApp to handle the PUT requests (line 10). This differs
from from handling the GET requests as it can deliver the
command as a parameter to updateSwithes().
2) The WebService SmartApp uploads a new event
When the WebService SmartApp receives an event, it should
send this event to the 3rd-party app immediately. This
procedure is also completed by HTTP methods, such as
httpGet() and httpPostJson().
C. SMARTTHINGS WORKING WITH THE
TRIGGER-ACTION APPS
Developers, including those from 3rd-parties, Samsung, and
the users themselves, have published or deployed numerous
apps on various 3rd-party platforms. To authorize a 3rd-
party service to his own devices, a user should first grant his
3rd-party account to access “resources” of his SmartThings
account. Then, SmartThings will automatically deploy a cor-
responding agent SmartApp to cooperate with the 3rd-party
service. Of course, this corresponding agent SmartApp is
developed and uploaded by the 3rd-party. After these steps,
the 3rd-party service is permitted to communicate with the
user’s end devices. We selected two popular IFTTT apps
which are related to SmartThings as follows.
1) Turn on Hue Lights when SmartThings detects that
you’ve arrived home (https://ifttt.com/applets/115637p-
turn-on-hue-lights-when-smartthings-detects-that-you-
ve-arrived-home, 1.2k users)
trigger: the presence sensor connects to the hub
(presenceSensor.presence == present)
action: turn on the light (switch.on())
2) Log door openings detected by your SmartThings
to Google Drive (https://ifttt.com/applets/114080p-
log-door-openings-detected-by-your-smartthings-to-a-
google-drive-spreadsheet, 4.6k users)
trigger: the state of the contact sensor turns to be open
(contactSensor.contact == open)
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action: write the log information to the Google Spread-
sheet of the user
As these two apps show, the IFTTT apps can link two
different Internet services to work together. If the trigger is a
SmartThings end device, then IFTTT will get the latest state
of the devices once the state has changed.
D. THE POPULARITY AND NECESSITY OF
TRIGGER-ACTION APPS
Though there have been numerous SmartApps published on
SmartThings, the demands on the automatic functionality
varies from user to user and this makes that it quite difficult
to find an app which is entirely suitable for a user. Most apps
can be described with a Trigger-Condition-Action model:
When a new event is triggered, if all the current conditions
have been satisfied, then the app will be invoked to execute
the action. These sophisticated apps must be created by the
developers or teams with sufficient professional knowledge,
such as Groovy language and the workflow of SmartThings.
However, these prerequisites are extremely difficult for an or-
dinary smart home user. Therefore, what most users actually
need is a platform that is easy to follow and can satisfy as
many as various environments as it can.
The Trigger-Action (TA for short) platforms emerged and
have been welcomed rapidly; using these platforms does
not rely on an amount of technical depth and offers much
more flexible choices to the users. With these TA platforms,
what a user needs to do is just connect the trigger device
and actuators to deploy an app. These apps are quite simple
but can cover most cases in daily life. These apps do not
need any expert knowledge about the smart home and their
functionalities are very intuitive to the user. The TA platforms
offer so many conveniences that research on TA 3rd-party
platforms is quite neccessary.
E. RELATED WORK
1) IoT security
Besides the QoS and routing issues [7]–[10], many efforts
also have been put on the security topic of Internet of Things,
mobile computing platforms, and smart home and personal
privacy for a long time [11]–[15]. The existing work has
proved how vital security is in IoT networks and devices [16].
The current IoT security research mainly analyzes the flaws
that come with hardware [17], protocols or key management
[18], and architectures. Sivaraman et al. analyzed threats and
flaws with devices on the market and proposed that SDN
technology can be used to block/quarantine and augment the
device security of the smart home [19]. Ali et al. investi-
gated some potential security attacks in smart homes and
evaluated their impacts [20]. This paper also forecasted that
security attacks are expected to be launched in coming years.
[21] proposed a logic based security algorithm to enhance
smart home security. The algorithm in this paper is imple-
mented to differentiate normal and suspicious user behavior.
Additionally, Blockchain has been applied to enhance the
security of the smart home. For example, [22] shows an
approach to provide decentralized security and privacy and
solves overhead issues that are not suitable for resources
and power constrained IoT devices. In 2016, Fernandes et
al. first analyzed the security flaws of SmartThings [4].
This paper exploited its framework flaws, including coarse-
grained capabilities, insufficient event data protection, flaws
in third-party application integration, and unsafe invocation
of the groovy dynamic method. Du et al. proposed the signif-
icance of key management of the communications between
IoT devices [23]. Lee et al. proposed FACT to handle the
coarse-grained capabilities problem in SmartThings [24] by
virtualizing the devices and their functionality. SmartAuth,
proposed in [25], aimed to check what a SmartApp actually
performs and the functionalities it shows to the user. While
some malicious operations may be revoked in some unnotice-
able scenarios, the ContexIoT was proposed to support the
users’ fine-grained context identification for some sensitive
actions [26]. To protect the privacy of the user, [27] proposed
how to track sensitive information in SmartThings through
static taint analysis of SmartApps.
2) The privacy of smart home
Although manufacturers have deployed various measure-
ments of their platforms, some papers still found flaws
leaking users’ privacy on various platforms [28]–[31]. There
have been many papers showing how to compromise a user’s
privacy via the flaws of cloud [32]–[35], protocols, voice in-
terface [36], or even traffic analysis. Yoshigoe et al. proposed
the Synthetic Packet Injection to hide the real traffic between
devices and the cloud [37]. This paper illustrated the traffic
patterns of several SmartThings devices. By the patterns of
different devices, an adversary can infer the behavior pattern
of a smart home user. Apthorpe et al. also focused on privacy
leakage via network observing [38], [39]. In this paper, they
evaluated several strategies to mitigate the risk of privacy
leakages when the network traffic is related to the privacy of
a user. Then, they proved that traffic shaping can effectively
prevent privacy leakages via traffic patterns. But to the best
of our knowledge, there are no papers focused on privacy
leakage via the 3rd-party apps.
III. PRIVACY LEAKAGE TO IFTTT
In this section, we will prove and demonstrate how the 3rd-
party platform acquires more redundant user data than it
actually needs for the functionalities. We use IFTTT as an
example to exploit how a 3rd-party platform can monitor the
privacy data of users in a way that is easily overlooked.
A. PRIVACY LEAKAGE BY UNTRIGGER-DEVICES
We treat the devices that cannot trigger any apps as
“untrigger-devices”. There are two types of untrigger-
devices: those that have been authorized to the 3rd-party
platform but are not related to any apps (we can also call
these devices “idle-devices”), and those related to apps but
as the actuators. These actuators only perform the commands
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of the related apps; they cannot trigger them. The states of
these devices are unnecessary to any apps, but the 3rd-party
platform will be monitoring all of these devices continuously
anyway.
1) By the idle-devices
When a user starts to configure to let a 3rd-party platform
access to SmartThings service, they are asked to grant the
authorization to the 3rd-party platform. Most users, if not all
of them, are willing to authorize all devices to the platform at
once, as they are unsure of what kind of apps they will install
and which device the new apps might access to in the future.
In other words, they are reluctant to go through the tedious
authorization process again. However, even if a user triggers
device authorization each time when they log in, there still
exists a possibility of idleness. Suppose a user is installing
an app to be triggered by a switch; when the user deletes this
app, the 3rd-party platform will not give up the permission to
access to this switch. This is how a new idle-device is created
in a way that is easily overlooked.
2) By the actuators
Actuators are another kind of untrigger-device because all
they do is passively receive commands from the 3rd-party
platform. This means the state change of an actuator is unnec-
essary for all the 3rd-party apps. But after the authorization,
the platform gains the permission to access these actuators.
This makes the 3rd-party platform not only able to operate
the actuators, but also to monitor the states of these devices.
3) Monitoring the untrigger-devices in a practical way
We reviewed code of the agent SmartApp of IFTTT [40],
webCoRE [41], and SharpTools [42], then we got the details
of how they monitor the states of untrigger-devices. To ex-
ploit this, we used the agent SmartApp code of IFTTT as a
representative example.
We start with the HTTP-mapping snippet of the agent
SmartApp, as shown in Listing. 2. It demonstrates that
IFTTT can obtain the states of all devices of the same
type at one time. For example, when the agent receives
an HTTP message of a GET request with the parameter
deviceType as humiditySensors, then the agent will
call listStates() and all numerical values of the hu-
midity sensors will be returned to IFTTT. IFTTT currently
support 11 kinds of devices: switch, motion sensor, contact
sensor, presence sensor, temperature sensor, acceleration sen-
sor, water sensor, light sensor, humidity sensor, alarm, and
lock. In daily life, data from these sensors can profile the
user’s behavior patterns and living environment. But IFTTT
does not care if a device can trigger an app or not. Once a
device is authorized to IFTTT, it will be monitored whenever
IFTTT wants, or even periodically.
1 mappings {
2 path("/:deviceType/states") {
3 action: [
4 GET: "listStates"
5 ]
6 }
7
8 path("/:deviceType/:id") {
9 action: [
10 GET: "show",
11 PUT: "update"
12 ]
13 }
14 }
Listing 2: The HTTP methods mapping snippet of the IFTTT
agent SmartApp.
B. LEAKING BY REDUNDANT STATE CHANGES
After checking the monitoring approaches via untrigger-
devices, we now focus on “trigger-devices”. Each IFTTT
app has a corresponding trigger statement. Every time the
state of a trigger device changes, the agent will upload the
new state (namely, an event) to IFTTT. If the trigger of an
app is satisfied by the event, it will be invoked and executed.
1 def addSubscription() {
2 subscribe(device, attribute, deviceHandler
)
3 }
4
5 def deviceHandler(evt) {
6 httpPostJson() {...
7 }
8 }
Listing 3: The IFTTT-SmartApp snippet of monitoring and
uploading the new events.
Listing. 3 demonstrates the process before the IFTTT agent
uploads a new event. Line 2 registers deviceHandler()
as the event handler to the attribute of the device.
Meanwhile, line 5 shows that the IFTTT agent does not
subscribe deviceHandler() to a specific attribute
value, but every change of attribute. This can be exem-
plified by the app “Turn on Hue Lights when SmartThings
detects that you’ve arrived home”. When the user arrives
home, his presence sensor connects to the hub. As a result, the
value of presenceSensor.presence will change from
unpresent to present. Next, deviceHandler()
will be invoked and post presenceSensor.presence
== present to IFTTT. At last, the app will be executed.
But when the user leaves home in the morning, IFTTT
will also receive the event presenceSensor.presence
== unpresent because its value changes. However,
presenceSensor.presence == unpresent will
not trigger any apps. This means that the unpresent is
unnecessary for all the apps. In other words, this event is
redundant. This also implies that if this redundant event is
intercepted before being uploaded to IFTTT, no app will be
distracted and all the apps will execute normally as long as
the next event can trigger it. After observing these present
events for several days, IFTTT can obtain the approximate
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arriving time of the user. If a user has no choice but to let
IFTTT know the exact arriving time, why should he also let
IFTTT know his leaving time?
1) Trigger-devices with discrete state values
A discrete-device is one that has a limited number of possible
states. For example, a presence sensor is a typical discrete-
device since the value of presenceSensor.presence
only contains two possibilities: present and unpresent.
Similarly, contact sensors, locks, and switches are all
discrete-devices. In order to protect the privacy of a user,
we can specify all the trigger values of these devices for all
apps, then the redundant values can be intercepted as they are
uploading to a 3rd-party platform.
2) Trigger-devices with numeric state values
Unlike the discrete-devices, the state of a numeric-device
covers a range of values. Humidity sensors, illuminance
sensors, and temperature sensors are all typical devices that
belong to this category. For instance, the state value range of
an illuminance sensor may range from 5lx (a street lamp) to
100,000lx (sunshine). Therefore, the app “If the illuminance
is exactly 50,000lx, then ...” will not be practically useful.
In most cases, triggering this kind of app corresponds to a
range, not a specific value. A threshold value divides the
possible range into two sub-ranges: the trigger-range and the
untrigger-range. Similar to discrete-devices, all state values
in the untrigger-range are redundant to the app. But by
specifying the trigger-range, we can further protect the user’s
privacy. Actually, we can hide redundant numeric state values
in two aspects. This also can be illustrated by the app “If the
temperature is above 30◦C, then turn on the switch.”
1) Suppose the state range of the temperature sensor is
[-20, 80]. The threshold value, 30, divides the whole
temperature range into two sub-ranges: [-20, 30] and
[31, 80].
2) We can hide changes when the values are below 31◦C,
because these states belong to the untrigger-range and
will not trigger this app. This means that the 3rd-party
platform will not be able to monitor the temperature
fluctuation when it is below 31◦C.
3) Even if the latest value is above 30◦C, we can hide
its accurate value. All temperatures above 30◦C will
trigger the app, regardless of whether it is 35◦C or
70◦C. So, why not transfer the actual temperature state
to a random value in the range of [31, 80]?
C. LEAKING BY THE UNNECESSARY TRIGGER VALUE
Now let us focus on “that” of an IFTTT app. The “that”
part will perform operations like “call my phone” or “play a
song from Google music.” It can also operate a SmartThings
actuator. When an app operating an actuator is triggered,
it will send an HTTP PUT message to the agent with the
corresponding command parameter. Then, the agent oper-
ates the actuator device. Additionally, the actuator can be
operated automatically or manually by the user. No matter
how the actuator is operated, it will upload its new state to
the SmartThings backend if the operation changes its state.
But sometimes the SmartApp command or manual operation
does not change the state of a device, and the device will
simply discard this command. Let us use the app, “If the
temperature is above 30◦C, then turn on the switch” as an
example again. The switch can be automatically or manually
turned on by the SmartApp or the user. When a switch has
been turned on, it receives a switch.on() command and
the switch does not need to repeat another switch.on()
operation, it will discard it. The switch.on() command
in this case is unnecessary as it changes nothing. This implies
that the app does not have to be invoked. Therefore, we can
conclude that if the current state of the actuator for an app
equals the consequential state value of the command, then
the app does not have to be invoked and the trigger event can
be intercepted before it will be uploaded to IFTTT. But now
even if all the events have been filtered or randomized as we
have described at Sec. III-A and Sec. III-B, there will be still
too many redundant events uploaded to IFTTT.
We also investigated the agent SmartApp code of web-
CoRE and SharpTools; it has been proved that there also
exists potential privacy leakage like IFTTT in these two
platforms.
IV. F&F: THE FILTERING COMPONENT
In this section, we will firstly introduce how F&F filters
redundant events. As for how to eliminate the statistical
character of the events, it will be illustrated in Sec. VI.
A. THE KEY INFORMATION ITEMS OF EVERY APP
We could extract key items that reflect how an IFTTT
app is triggered and what it will do. These items
include the trigger device, trigger state or
state range for a numeric-device, the actuator
(if any), and the consequential state value of
the actuator (if any, CSV for short). There is a
one-to-one mapping between a 3rd-party app and the
combination of all key information. For example, all
the key information of “If the temperature is above
30◦C, then turn on the switch” can be summarized
as {trigger device: temperature sensor, trigger
state (range): [31, 100], actuator: switch, the
CSV of the actuator: on}. The first step of F&F is
to extract the key information from the apps that are in use. If
there are D devices subscribed to a user who has installed A
apps, then we will obtain the corresponding A records, and
A ≤ D.
B. EXTRACT THE KEY INFORMATION VIA A CHROME
EXTENSION
A user can manage his 3rd-party service configuration via
a mobile app or a desktop web browser. Take IFTTT
as an example; all apps can be displayed in the page
“https://ifttt.com/my_applets” (Fig. 2). Each app in the
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FIGURE 2: The IFTTT website displays all the apps of a
user.
browser is labeled by a one-sentence description, from which
the user can catch the functionality of an app at a glance.
These label sentences are embedded in the HTML source
code of the “/my_applets” page. We can find these descriptive
sentences in the span tags with the class value “title”.
The corresponding HTML snippet is shown in Listing 4.
To IFTTT, we developed a Chrome extension to extract
these sentences. This Chrome app can transfer all the sen-
tences to a new form where every descriptive sentence is split
into key information items. To the other 3rd-party services,
they also provide a web-based configuration interface. There-
fore, all the key information items can also be extracted in
this way.
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html>
3 <span class="title">
4 If Any new motion detected by
Motion_Sensor_A, then Switch on
Switch_A
5 </span>
6 </html>
Listing 4: The descriptive sentences of all the IFTTT apps
can be found in the HTML code.
C. MERGE THE KEY INFORMATION COLLECTION
This step is transforming the A records to a new form where
all records will be merged by identical trigger-devices. We
denote the list of trigger-devices as T , and |T | ≤ A because
sometimes a trigger-device can be subscribed by several
apps. Suppose that the lists of discrete-devices and numeric-
devices are Td and Tn respectively, then |T | = |Td|+ |Tn|.
TABLE 1: Map the state values of a discrete-device to the
consequential states of the actuators that it can trigger.
Actuator1 ... Actuatora
S1
CSV of Actuator1
(if exists) ...
CSV of Actuatora
(if exists)
... ... ... ...
St
CSV of Actuator1
(if exists) ...
CSV of Actuatora
(if exists)
... × ... ×
Sp × ... ×
1) Merge the A records of discrete-devices
A specific state value of a discrete-device may trigger zero,
one or multiple apps. To a discrete-device, we assume that
this device corresponds to a actuators. All potential state
values of this discrete-device form a set S with p elements,
but only t of these elements can trigger an app, and t ≤ p.
After checking these a apps triggered by this device, a table
can be generated to show the mapping between every value of
S in a list, which consists of the consequential state of every
actuator, shown in Table. 1. Every row of this table contains
at least one element. For each trigger and discrete-device, a
similar table can be generated.
2) Merge the records of numeric-devices
A numeric-device triggers apps with a range rather than a
specific value. Like discrete-devices, the current value of a
numeric-device may trigger zero, one, or multiple actuators.
For example: “If Illuminance sensor detects brightness above
500lx, then switch off SwitchA” and “If Illuminance sensor
detects brightness above 600lx, then switch off SwitchB .”
Like discrete-devices, the state of a numeric-device may
trigger the operation of one or multiple devices at the same
time (e.g., the brightness is 650lx), or trigger no app (e.g.,
the brightness is 400lx). The corresponding app may be
triggered or not depending on whether the current state
value is above or below a threshold value. After checking
all the apps that are triggered by a specific numeric-device,
F&F will take threshold values and split the measuring range
of this device into several sub-ranges. If there are t threshold
values, F&F will arrange these t values in ascending order
to form a list. Each element in this list is denoted as Li
(1 6 i 6 t), and L1 6 ... 6 Lt. Then the measuring range
covering min to max will be divided into t + 1 sub-ranges:
[min,L1], [L1+1, L2]...[Lt+1,max]. We also can generate
a table for a trigger and numeric-device, as shown in Table. 2.
For each trigger and numeric-device, a similar table can be
generated.
D. FILTER AND RANDOMIZE PROCEDURE
After extracting key information from apps and merg-
ing items, the F&F can begin working. The procedure of
F&F consists of intercepting the event from an untrigger-
device, intercepting events that cannot trigger any apps, inter-
cepting events can unnecessarily trigger an app, and finally,
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TABLE 2: Map the numeric range of a numeric-device to the
consequential states of the actuators that it can trigger.
Actuator1 ... Actuatora
[min,L1]
CSV of Actuator_1
(if exists) ...
CSV of Actuator_a
(if exists)
... ... ... ...
[Lt + 1,max]
CSV of Actuator_1
(if exists) ...
CSV of Actuator_a
(if exists)
randomizing values within a numeric range.
1) When a new event comes to the agent SmartApp of
F&F, the agent first checks if the event is from a trigger-
device or not. If the corresponding device is not in T ,
then all events from this device should not be uploaded.
2) F&F has constructed the trigger-state lists for each
trigger-device. After the first step, although this new
event comes from a device that belongs to T , if it does
not belong to the trigger-state lists of this device, it will
also not be uploaded.
3) After the above two steps, F&F will check the current
state value of the corresponding actuator (if there is
a corresponding SmartThings actuator device). If the
current state value equals the consequential state value
of the app, it means that this event will change nothing
if it is uploaded, and this event will be intercepted too.
4) Finally, if the event is to be uploaded, F&F will check
if the event is numeric or not. If it is a numeric event,
F&F will firstly check the sub-range of this value
(Table. 2) and generate a random value within the sub-
range.
An event will not be uploaded until it has been checked by
these steps.
V. REDUNDANCY OF THE ORIGINAL EVENT RECORDS
In this section, we prove the redundancy of the event records
that are uploaded to the 3rd-party platforms. With the filtering
feature of F&F, the amount of the events that are uploaded to
a 3rd-party platforms will be decreased rapidly.
A. CASAS DATASETS OVERVIEW
We analyzed four CASAS [43] datasets: hh104, hh105,
hh110, and hh111. These datasets are the monitoring records
of different users living in a single apartment over two
months, except hh110, which is for about one month. The
event records in each single-apartment include events gen-
erated by the motion sensors, contact sensors, temperature
sensors, switches, and remaining battery of some devices.
B. SET THE APPLETS FOR EVERY DATASET
We divided all the devices of every dataset into two groups:
trigger-devices and idle-devices. In the trigger-device group,
motion sensors and contact sensors are discrete-devices, and
temperature sensors are numeric-devices. In the idle-device
group, there is an actuator sub-group. We used switches as
TABLE 3: Comparing the amount of event records of original
and filtered datasets (all database starts at 2011-06-15)
hh104 hh105 hh110 hh111
Amount of devices 26 19 15 22
Trigger-devices 6 6 7 8
Original datasets 125900 91055 41802 100896
Datasets filtered by F&F 2831 1317 972 1599
actuators because they can be operated both automatically or
manually as mentioned above.
We set one app for every switch, and randomly selected
devices from the trigger-device group for every app. Then,
all remaining devices are idle-devices.
1) For discrete-devices, we set the apps as: if the value
of motion sensor is “active,” or if the value of contact
sensor is “open”, then the corresponding switch is
turned on.
2) We calculated the average value of every temperature
sensor and set the rules triggered by these temperature
sensors as: if the temperature is above its average
value, then the corresponding switch is turned on.
For each CASAS dataset, we compare the amount of event
records before and after filtering by F&F.
C. COMPARING THE RECORDS AMOUNT
Each event record of a user contains behavior pattern infor-
mation for that user. The more event records IFTTT gets,
the more likely IFTTT is able to discover and recognize
the behavior pattern of a user. So, this leads to one feature
of F&F: filtering as many events are uploaded to IFTTT as
possible. We experimented with the datasets and compared
the results before and after filtering F&F. This is can be
shown in Table. 3. As we can see, for the same dataset,
the F&F significantly reduces the amount of the records
significantly compared to the original dataset. The amount of
event records uploaded to the 3rd-party platform is no more
than 2.2% (hh104) of the original dataset.
D. COMPARING THE NUMERIC RECORDS
For numeric records, F&F filters redundant events and ran-
domizes their values. We believe that these fluctuations can
also reflect a user’s behavior patterns. Then, IFTTT cannot
track the fluctuation of the temperature, humidity, and illumi-
nance in a living environment. Fig. 3 shows the comparison
of the records from selected temperature sensors that are
either filtered by F&F or not. The red line plots the records
accessible to IFTTT, while the green line plots records that
are processed by F&F. This proves that after filtering by F&F,
IFTTT can only get a few records, none of which are accurate
(only the first 10 days’ records are shown).
VI. F&F: THE FUZZING COMPONENT
In this section, we will introduce the fuzzing component of
F&F that eliminates the statistical characters of the events
that uploaded to IFTTT or the other TA platforms.
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(a) (b)
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FIGURE 3: Comparison the numeric values of eight temper-
ature sensors from different datasets that are uploaded to two
datasets.
A. BEHAVIOR PATTERN OF A TRIGGER-ACTION USER
For the Trigger-Action model, the 3rd-party platforms can
profile a user’s behavior pattern through raw data. As a typ-
ical representation of 3rd-party platforms, IFTTT can obtain
plenty of information just from the time of the event records
without any sophisticated mechanisms. For example, the
daily routine (leaving and returning home), physical health
status (activity frequency in the bathroom when it is late
at night), and living environment, etc., by present sensors,
motion sensors, and temperature/humidity/illuminance sen-
sors, respectively. So, we can treat a user’s behavior pattern
as the random variable of events at different time intervals
of a day. After observing a user for several days, we can
get the random variable X = X(h) to denote the average
amount of the events from a specific devices in different
intervals (e.g. if h denotes different hours) of a day. If the
observation time is long enough, each X = X(h) will
approach a static value. Then, each user will own a unique
vector of [X(1), · · · , X(24)]. In other words, we can treat the
vector [X(1), · · · , X(24)] as a user’s behavior pattern after
sufficient observation. We use U to denote this vector, then
[X(1), · · · , X(24)] can also be denoted as [u1, · · · , u24].
After filtering redundant events, we know that the amount
of event records uploaded to IFTTT has been significantly
reduced. Therefore, to the IFTTT platformsome, some infor-
mation relative to the user has been lost (by intercepting the
redundant event records) and this becomes an obstacle for
IFTTT to find some behavior patterns of a user using data
mining or statistics approaches. But after filtering the records,
the event records that have to be uploaded to IFTTT or other
3rd-party platforms can still reveal a user’s behavior patterns.
u10
f10
p10
FIGURE 4: Filtered records shows highly relative to original
records.
B. PRIVACY LEAKAGE VIA THE FILTERED EVENT
RECORDS
After filtering, each single record that is uploaded to IFTTT
contains information of when it happened (time of day, day
of week, weekend or workday, and so on). For instance, if
a user deployed several sensors and set an app of “If any
new motion is detected by the motion_sensor, then turn
on the light.” After filtering, IFTTT and other 3rd-party
platforms will obtain fewer records because the events from
other sensors will all be intercepted, and the events from this
motion_sensor may be intercepted with a probability. We
can compare the original and filtered event records of the
“turn on the light” app after several days. From the original
event records, we can obtain the vector U . At the same time,
we can also obtain F as another vector that contains the
statistical character of the filtered event records. For the i-
th elements in U and F , which denote the mean amount of
the events in the i-the hour of a day, fi is less than ui since
the events in the i-th hour may be intercepted by chance.
Therefore, F = [f1, · · · , f24] = [u1×p1, · · · , u24×p24], and
P = [p1, · · · , p24] is the vector that denotes the probability
of intercepting an event that is to be uploaded to IFTTT in
each hour.
In most cases, pi will be a relatively stable value in P .
Then there will be an extreme high correlation coefficient
between [u1, · · · , u24] and [f1, · · · , f24]. This means that,
just filtering the original event records is not adequate for
preventing IFTTT or other 3rd-party platforms to investigate
a user’s behavior patterns.
We prove this by monitoring a user living in a single
apartment for 10 days. This user deployed several sensors
and actuators, including a contact sensor, two motion sensors,
and five lights. This user set the app “If any new motion is
detected by the motion_sensor, then turn on the light” to
automatically turn on the light in his restroom. After 10 days
observing, we obtain U and F , which are shown in Fig 4.
We can observe that although the sum of all items in F
is much less than U , the statistical character of U was quite
similar to F . The behavior patterns inferred from U can be
also obtained from F . This proves that filtering the original
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event records still can expose information about a user’s
behavior patterns after a short observation period.
C. FUZZING COMPONENT THAT CONCEALS THE
STATISTICAL CHARATER OF EVENTS
1) Main idea
Due to the stateless aspect of Trigger-Action IoT apps,
IFTTT and other 3rd-party platforms that run TA apps are
only responsible for replying if the current event comes from
the smart home. When a new event arrives, all IFTTT needs
to do is send back the corresponding command message (if
any) to the smart home platform. Our goal is to mix some
pseudo-events into the filtered event records. As the 3rd-party
platform can not distinguish between genuine and pseudo
events, we can use this method to “fuzz” the filtered dataset
and consequently make IFTTT and other 3rd-party platforms
unable to reveal the statistical character of the user’s actual
behavior pattern. If the dataset obtained by IFTTT shows no
correlation to the filtered dataset, IFTTT will learn nothing
about the filtered event dataset. The same applies for other
3rd-party platforms.
2) The fuzzing workflow
We design the fuzzing feature as an additional component
that works between the smart home platform and IFTTT.
The fuzzing component of F&F can preserve the regular
functionality of the apps running on IFTTT and other 3rd-
party platforms, and conceals the user’s behavior patterns.
This component works between a smart home platform S and
several 3rd-party platforms. For a specific 3rd-party platform,
for example, IFTTT, we use T to denote it. For the current
communication between S and T , there are many users who
trigger their sensors and yield events each second, then S will
pack up these events and send them to T . Finally, S waits for
the command messages from T . But the fuzzing component
of F&F modifies this procedure and works as follows.
1) In each second, before sending the “real” events to T ,
S will generate a number of pseudo-events by Fuzz()
and will pack up the real-events and pseudo-events.
Fuzz() can generate pseudo-events corresponding to
any devices of all the users.
2) To differentiate the real and pseudo events, S will
maintain a list in which each item is the state of a
device. Each item is a tuple with the format of [time
stamp, user id, device id, event value,
pseudo-label].
3) Next, after receiving the event list from S, T will send
back a list of commands corresponding the different
apps that triggered by the event records in the event
list. As T can not distinguish whether the items in the
event list are true or not, it will reply to the whole event
list with a command list. The format of the items in the
command list is [time stamp, user id, device
id, command].
4) Finally, S receives the list of the commands and
only retains the commands that correspond to ac-
tual events by matching the time stamp, user
id, and device id, as well as checking the
pseudo-label. By checking the pseudo-label,
S will decide whether to deliver the command to the
device or just discard it.
By adopting a proper Fuzz(), the actual and pseudo
events are indistinguishable to any 3rd-party platforms, in-
cluding IFTTT. Therefore, the statistical character of the
actual events will be harder or even impossible to be extracted
by IFTTT.
D. THE PSEUDO-EVENTS GENERATOR
As the pseudo-events generator, Fuzz() should achieve two
goals at the same time: the pseudo events can efficiently fuzz
IFTTT, and can constrain the extra overhead of smart homes
and IFTTT. For a specific user, the most ideal Fuzz() is
one that can get rid of all the statistical characters for all of
his devices.
1) Generating pseudo events in an intuitive way
To any device of a specific user, an intuitive way of designing
Fuzz() is generating its pseudo events with an arbitrary
possibility that is irrelevant to the behavior patterns of the
user. However, by the law of Large Numbers, we know that
after a long enough period of time, the amount of pseudo
events will form a uniform distribution for each time interval.
Then the distribution of the event records that are obtained by
the 3rd-party platform will be exactly identical to the event
records without any pseudo events. Therefore, Fuzz() im-
plemented in this way will be meaningless for protecting a
user’s behavior patterns.
2) Dynamic Fuzz()
We designed the Fuzz() algorithm with a feature that al-
lows it to adjust itself by generating pseudo events according
to the actual behavior patterns of a user. By observing the
user’s behavior pattern during several recent days, Fuzz()
can generate pseudo events by adjusting itself so that the
amount of event records obtained by the 3rd-party platform
will remain in a static pattern and carry no information about
a user’s behavior patterns. To achieve this, Fuzz() sets a
target distributionD. Then, Fuzz() will dynamically adjust
itself to generate the pseudo events to make sure the event
records obtained by the 3rd party platform are always dis-
tributed as D. This ensures that the 3rd party learns nothing
from this static distribution.
3) The steps of dynamic Fuzz()
In order to make the sum of actual and pseudo events equal to
a relatively stable value, the essential dynamic of Fuzz() is
first establishingD, then adjusting the probability of generat-
ing pseudo events as time goes on. We denote the distribution
of the events after filtering as F . F is quite similar to the
original behavior pattern vector U , as we mentioned above.
Then the steps of dynamic Fuzz() are as follows.
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FIGURE 5: Mask() with ideal fuzzification.
1) Monitor a user for p days to obtain/update the behavior
pattern vector F .
2) Establish the target vector D with n elements (e.g. n
= 24). These n elements correspond to n portions of
a whole day and can have arbitrary distributions for
various user behavior patterns, but the max ofD should
equal the max of F . For each di in D:
a) If elements ofD have a uniform distribution, then
d1 = d2 = · · · = dn = max(fi).
b) If elements of D have a Gaussian distribution,
then µ (the expected value of D) is equals
max(fi). According to the 3-σ rule, σ should be
equal or greater than n/6.
3) Get another n-element vector Y . For each element yi
in Y :
a) If di ≥ fi, yi = di − fi;
b) If di < fi, yi = 0.
4) We assume that in each of the n portions, the smart
home platform will send the event records form times.
Then, for each time the smart home platform packs the
records:
a) If there is an actual event, then Fuzz() does
nothing and the smart home will send the actual
event to the 3rd-party platform;
b) If there is no actual event, then Fuzz() will
generate a pseudo event by a probability of yi/m.
5) Adjust F according to the filtered event records during
the past p days and repeat 2 – 4.
E. TWO FUZZ() PROPOSALS
We propose two varieties of Fuzz(). For each Fuzz(), the
effects and overheads are different.
1) The ideal Fuzz()
As we know, an array containing fixed elements shows no
correlations to any other arrays. If we make the elements in
D all relatively stable, then it will be more difficult for a 3rd-
party platform to infer the original distribution of a user’s
event records, namely the characters of F or U . In an ideal
scenario, all elements in D will be identical values and the
correlation coefficient between D and F will be 0. In this
case, the elements of D have a uniform distribution. In order
to cover the peak of F , we let d1 = d2 = · · · = dn = max(fi).
This can be illustrated in Fig 5.
FIGURE 6: Mask() with a Gaussian distribution.
2) Fuzz() with a Gaussian distribution
If D is a vector that does not contain fixed but variable
elements, it can also hide the characteristics of F to prevent
the 3rd-party platforms from learning something from F .
This can be done by making D a static vector. Then, maybe
the relationship coefficient between D and F is greater than
it is betweenD with uniform a distribution and F , but IFTTT
still can not infer many characters because various F vectors
can be masked by an identical D vector.
As we can see, for the i-th element in D, the overhead is
yi = di − fi. For all the elements in Y , yi can be reduced if
fi is a relatively small value because di can also be set as a
small value (but can not be less than fi).
Therefore, we can reduce the overhead by modifying the
elements in D to make them have a Gaussian distribution.
Then µ (the expected value ofD) equalsmax(fi). According
to the 3-σ rule, σ should be equal or greater than n/6.
Besides the peak element, all other elements are less than
max(fi); this can make D a static vector and the sum of all
the elements less than it is with a uniform distribution. This
can be illustrated in Fig 6.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate Fuzz() by: 1) the amount
of pseudo events generated by Fuzz() and 2) how some
representative machine learning algorithms can figure out the
characters of a vector.
A. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENTS FOR EVALUATION
The main idea of our experiments is evaluating how much
personal profiling information is still contained in the behav-
ior pattern vectors. We used two prevalant machine learning
algorithms, KNN and SVM, to compare the success rate of
identifying a user’s pattern vector before and after mixing
pseudo events. Additionally, we also compare the amount of
the pseudo events by different kinds of Fuzz().
B. DATASET FOR TRAINING AND TESTING
For both the actual and pseudo event records, we all can
obtain the corresponding behavior pattern vectors by days.
After 100 days observing two volunteers who lived in two
single apartments with identical layouts, we obtained 100
vectors of filtered event records for each of them. We encour-
aged them to keep their normal behavior patterns, and two
actual vectors between the two volunteers had a correlation
coefficient of nearly 0.93.
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We used all the vectors from each volunteer to obtain a
200-vector dataset, and then tested KNN and SVM. We split
the dataset into training (70%) and testing (30%) portions.
The results showed that though the correlation coefficient
between the behavior pattern vectors of the two volunteers
is as high as 0.93, after more than 10 experiments, the correct
rates of distinguishing a behavior pattern vector were at least
98%. This proved the accuracy and high performance of the
two machine learning algorithms.
C. EVALUATING THE OVERHEAD AND MASKING
EFFECT
We evalutated the overhead and fuzzing effect of the two
Fuzz() schemes, corresponding to two privacy protection
levels. As we can see from Fig 5 and Fig 6, the amount
of pseudo-records inserted by the ideal fuzzification is more
than that of a Gaussian distribution. But we can also see that
in a Gaussian distribution, some elements of a vector cannot
be masked, and the result is kept as a static character. This
decreases the security of masking with Gaussian distribution
and also lowers the overhead compared to the ideal fuzzifica-
tion. After 100 days, there were 1772 and 2204 event records
from each of the two users. The comparison results can be
shown in Fig. 7
1) Overhead
We evaluated how many pseudo records should be inserted
into these two datasets, and after 10 experiments, the ratio of
the amount of records after masking and filtering is shown in
Fig. 7(a). As we can see, the ideal fuzzification needs more
pseudo items to mask the character of the filtered records.
2) Correlation between the masked records and filtered
records
If the Fuzz() adopts the ideal fuzzing algorithm, the cor-
relation coefficient between the masked records and filtered
records is roughly around 0, which means that the masked
records will hardly reveal anything about the filtered records.
But when Fuzz() adopts a Gaussian distribution on the
masked records, this result will increase to 0.68. Fig. 7(b)
shows the results of 10 experiments.
3) Success rate of KNN and SVM
As we collected the event records from two users, when
Fuzz() showed a stronger effect to eliminate the statistical
character of the users, the successful rate of distinguishing
the two users by a vector would be closer to 0.5. Our experi-
ment verified the effectiveness of Fuzz()with ideal fuzzing
and Gaussian distribution. As shown in Fig. 7(c), when
Fuzz() adopts a Gaussian distribution, the success rate of
KNN and SVM is about 0.7. Considering the fact that the
success rate will be 0.5 if Fuzz() just randomly determines
the group of a vector, a success rate of 0.7 means these two
machine learning algorithms were “guessing randomly” in
most vectors. The ideal Fuzz() has a success rate close to
0.5, proving its efficiency. This is because it means that no
personal behavioral information is leaked to IFTTT and other
3rd-party platforms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy will be of ongoing interest, especially
in the smart home environment. In this paper, we studied
how IFTTT monitors its smart home users in a hidden way
and proposed F&F for preventing this privacy leakage by:
filtering the redundant event records that are uploaded to
IFTTT and concealing the statistical characters of the events
to fuzz IFTTT. We use IFTTT as the representative target, but
we believe that F&F can also be applied to other integrated
3rd-party services with the same architecture.
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